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THE OUTSIDER WITHIN: THE RADICAL, NOT-So-SCARY
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE OF ANN SCALES
KATHRYN ABRAMSt
ABSTRACT
In her aspirations for the law, in the methods by which she exhorted
readers to engender change, in her unique, transgressive, often outra-
geous voice, Ann Scales was the consummate "outsider." But she also
understood the importance of engaging those who could make change
possible. Thus Ann not only spoke truth to power, but also knew how to
communicate it in registers that legal decision makers could at least
sometimes apprehend. This Essay explores the work of Ann Scales in
both "outsider" and "insider" modes, and examines the ways her teach-
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INTRODUCTION
It is a bittersweet task to take stock of the wonderful, challenging
work of Ann Scales. It is hard not to feel sadness and anger about he
occasion of these reflections; someone who did the world as much good
as Ann did should have had 75, 80, 100 years in which to do her work.
But I have been energized by the opportunity this Symposium has given
me to return to some of this extraordinary work, and think about what it
means for all of us, and for the feminist and queer advocacy-and other
forms of contending for equality-that we will continue to do.
This task of figuring out "what the work means" is a little more
challenging with Ann than with some other feminist theorists because
there are different facets, orientations, and tones to her work. I will focus
t Herma Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law.
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in this Essay on one tension that I have always found fascinating: Ann is
sometimes the consummate "outsider"rain the words of this Symposium,
"Raising Hell and Having Fun"-finding all kinds of interesting ways to
exhort her fellow travelers to critical perspectives and transgressive be-
havior. But this is not the only Ann Scales I find in the work I have re-
read over the past few months. Later in her career, though not exclusive-
ly there, Ann seemed to move from happy warrior to skillful conciliator,
trying to explain to legal actors why they needed feminist thought, or
why it was not as scary, or as alien to their familiar concerns and practic-
es, as they imagined. This was a more carefully controlled presentation,
but it was no less committed and no less empathetic. Ann understood that
it was hard for judges to move out of what she called their places of
"stuckness" and she wanted to share with them resources-in many cas-
es, feminist theoretical resources-that would permit them to do it. In
this mode, she seems more like the early Ruth Bader Ginsburg (to whose
modest, stealth innovations she would sometimes respond with sisterly
frustration) than Catharine MacKinnon (with whom she so strongly iden-
tified in her work). So was Ann Scales a joyful, nonconforming outsider
or a pragmatic insider? The answer, of course, is both-in a challenging,
ultimately complementary, combination. In my comments, I hope to
demonstrate how these parts of Ann's work fit together and what their
juxtaposition reveals.
My effort to fit these pieces together will highlight four aspects of
Ann's work: her affective or emotional range, her pragmatism, her view
of law, and her view of human agency. In developing these ideas I will
focus on specific examples of Ann's work, particularly pieces that strike
me as being in one vein or another. My hope is to "show" as much as I
"tell" because Ann was a wonderfully vivid writer; sometimes just hear-
ing her language makes things clearer than I could ever make them by
paraphrasing.
I. ANN SCALES AS IRREVERENT OUTSIDER
I will begin with a few of the works that capture Ann in her outsider
mode-her sometimes outrageous, persistently nonconforming angle of
vision on the legal world around her. Two of these works focus on legal
education and one looks at another of her favorite substantive topics,
militarism and jurisprudential method. An Absolutely, Positively True
Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, one of Ann's earliest works, de-
scribes a fabulous course that she co-taught to introduce first-year stu-
dents to law.' The course was full of history, sociology, and philosophy,
and it confronted students with the most emotionally charged examples
possible (from pornography to nuclear holocaust). But much of the arti-
1. Karl Johnson & Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We
Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986).
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cle focuses on the way Ann and her colleague Karl Johnson began the
course. First they read a quote by Woody Guthrie:
I hate a song that makes you think that you're not any good. I hate a
song that makes you think that you are just born to lose. Bound to
lose. No good to nobody. No good for nothing.... Songs that run
you down or songs that poke fun at you on account of your bad luck
or your hard traveling. I am out to fight those kinds of songs to my
very last breath of air and my last drop of blood. I am out to sing
songs that will prove to you that this is your world and that if it has
hit you pretty hard and knocked you for a dozen loops, no matter how
hard it's run you down and rolled over you,... I am out to sing the
songs that make you take pride in yourself and in your work.
2
Then they led students in a rousing version of Guthrie's This Land
is Your Land. The "seven reasons" of the title explain why it is entirely
fitting to begin students' legal education with a song. These reasons are
riveting because they confront just about everything law schools conven-
tionally communicate to students about their legal education. Consider
number one: "[W]hen you're down, it's hard to sing and even harder to
learn," where she is telling us that legal education works better when it
makes students feel good about themselves rather than confused, inade-
quate, or clueless.3 Or number four: "[Y]ou could think about songs, but
it's much better to sing them."4 Here she celebrates the fact that Woody
Guthrie does not "'think[]' like a traveler," he "roam[s] and ramble[s]"
and follows his footsteps, and "[b]y the end of his journey, he knows
more about the territory than any rational explanation of it could have
told him."5 In case readers have any doubt that Ann was advocating non-
linearity and departures from purely rational forms of cognition in law
school, she adds that logic presses us toward dichotomies and critiquing
logic and its dichotomies gains us only partial release: "[T]o go further,
we must break the rules of logic. We must put ourselves at risk. We must
dare, we must dream, we must act. We must sing.",6 And there are num-
bers five and seven: "[W]hy can't law celebrate our creativity the way
singing can?"' and "[Y]ou don't have to sing someone else's songs; you
can make up your own."8 These reasons convey the unlikely message
that you do not have to empty yourself out to be the blank and neutral
receptacle of the law-your creativity and your perspective have value as
you strive to learn the law and give it meaning.
2. Id. at 434.
3. Id. at 437-39.
4. Id. at 446.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 448.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 453.
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But because all students cannot start their education with Woody
Guthrie, Ann wrote Surviving Legal De-Education, a guide for students
who have to manage law schools as they are conventionally structured.9
A key problem with this kind of education, according to Ann, is that it is
premised on one kind of emotional experience: that of the autonomous
individualist, whose occasional urges toward community or altruism can
be easily satisfied.10 Law schools then call this emotional experience
"objectivity" and make it the focus of assigned readings and classroom
discussions." If this account tracks your experience, you are likely to
feel ratified and no more than typically uncomfortable in law school.
12
As Ann explained:
To that person, the [law school] story says, "You are not alone and
your existential doubts are exactly the ones we are all working on.
We can't actually have communitarian presumptions, of course, but
we can have lots of exceptions to individualistic rules, so long as they
are carefully managed. Just help us consolidate these limits. Good
thing you're here to help!"'
13
If this account of human experience does not align with your life or
inclinations, however, you must "divorce those experiences from the
study of the story, and relegate feelings to a separate realm, perhaps nev-
er to be heard from again."'4 Performing this distancing operation on a
daily basis can make you feel like you have "acid slowly dripping on
[your] soul[]."' 15 This disparate experience is particularly painful, as Ann
observed, because the latter group tends to be composed of women and
people of color. 16
But Ann was not prepared to surrender to this grim reality: her goal
is to create "happy outsiders" in law school. This is no small undertak-
ing, and the article aims to give law students some direction for achiev-
ing it. Framed as a set of lively imperatives, the ideas she proposed tell
us something about how Ann herself approached an imperfect law school
world. They are to be applied, Ann proposed, in a "multilithic" way-
"sort of randomly, when you feel like it. The combined effect, one hopes,
will be like raindrops wearing away a stone."'17 Some of these proposals
involve important elements of jurisprudential critique. "Question authori-
9. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139
(1990) [hereinafter Surviving Legal De-Education].
10. Id. at 142-43.
11. Id.
12. Ann notes that members of this group "are miserable, but in a homey way. They are being
exhausted but well-nourished while in training for The Race." Id. at 142.
13. Id. at 143.
14. Id. at 142.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 147.
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ty, ' I Ann instructed; in particular, question meta-standards for evaluat-
ing legal rules (such as "predictability") that do not tell you anything
about the ultimate ends of the law.19 For Ann, as for her jurisprudential
hero Lon Fuller, meta-standards and garden variety legal rules must be
informed by the larger goals toward which legal practices are directed.2°
Assertions of authority that neglect or disavow the broader social goals
that animate law should be viewed with skepticism. Other imperatives
focus on language: for example, "Question sports metaphors."2' Sports
metaphors do not simply authorize the experience of men: they may em-
phasize dimensions of rule-based game playing that are alien even to
women who played sports, and may starkly understate the stakes of legal
decision making.22 A better answer, Ann argued, is mothering metaphors,
which capture more accurately the perpetually legitimating, justificatory
task of the judge:
Think about it: when you tell a child to do something, when you is-
sue what you hope to be an authoritative command, the child's re-
sponse very often is to ask why. .. . Successful mothering does not
depend on making references to some higher authority. Rather, it de-
pends upon judgment and justification (We might even call it "rea-
soned elaboration"). It depends on a willingness to explain the rule in
some cases, and a willingness to suspend the rule when the situation
indicates it ... Sports are pre-arranged contests of strength, with very
little flexibility in the rules. Mothering is a constant process of nego-
tiation and judgment. It is a dialectic of persuasion. Like the authority
of law, the mother's authority must be earned every day.
23
Still other suggestions-some of my favorites-are tactical. "Use
the power you have. You are the consumers of legal education today and
the alumnae of tomorrow."24 More colloquially, this means "do every-
body a favor, raise some hell today"25: dog the path of the law school
dean, mount letter-writing campaigns, organize boycotts. And finally,
"Take care of yourselves and each other and have real fun." 26 This soli-
daristic note makes surviving-and potentially transforming-law school
a collaborative, even celebratory, project.27
18. Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 148-49.
20. "We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal
concepts without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this
activity directed?" Id. at 148 (quoting L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936)).
21. Id. at 149-52.
22. Id. at 150-51.
23. Id. at 152.
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 163.
26. Id.
27. In this article, as in the others discussed in this section, Ann relished her role as an outsid-
er, noting:
2013]
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The final article in the outsider category is a different kind of arti-
cle. In Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron?, Ann was concerned with the commanding, corrosive force
of militarism on U.S. governance and society.28 The article offers a chal-
lenging critique of militarism and law's relation to it, and a novel discus-
sion of how feminists might resist it, from inside and outside legal insti-
tutions. Ann's highly original critique of militarism steps deftly beyond
the most familiar feminist responses to the military: a claim to access that
foregoes systematic institutional critique,29  and a critical pacifism
grounded in women's sometimes essentialized tendency toward nurtur-
ance.30 Ann's focus was not on the military per se, but on the logic of
militarism. She argued that it is driven by the same engines of dehumani-
zation that fuel the oppression of women; in fact, the two operate as mu-
tually reinforcing phenomena.31 Moreover, the law defends militarism by
insisting on a series of dichotomies that similarly serve to undergird
women's oppression: the subjective, personal objections of the protesters
versus the objective security interests of the nation; the lay judgments of
citizens versus the opinions of military experts; the unruly behavior of
the protesters versus the careful deference of the judicial posture.32 Fem-
inists are well situated to teach us how to take responsibility for milita-
rism, and how to make whole the splits or dichotomies that protect it.
The primary exemplars of such responsibility, in Ann's view, are
the fearless civil disobedients of the Greenham Common Women's
Peace Encampment-a group of extraordinary women who camped out
for years to protest Britain's installation of American nuclear missiles.33
These women barricaded the base where the missiles were installed,
danced on the siloes, suffered thousands of efforts at legal eviction and
arrests for various forms of direct action, and served prison time for their
committed work.34 Some of them came to the United States and sued
President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger for violations of
I would not wish to be anything other than An Other at this moment.... Women have
reached a critical mass in law school. Outsiders in coalition are the majority. There is
emotional and intellectual space for us to begin. If you don't believe it, just consider that
you are reading this in a law review.
Id.
28. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989) [hereinafter Militarism, Male Dominance and Law].
29. This kind of feminist position would seem to be exemplified in Justice Ginsburg's opinion
for the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550-51 (1996).
30. See, e.g., SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 17
(1989). A particularly sophisticated example of this kind of feminist argument, Ruddick's position
avoided the essentialism that sometimes characterizes efforts to link women, mothering, and paci-
fism, because her argument is that pacifism arises from the habits of mind that are cultivated through
the work of nurturance, particularly of young children, rather than from women's nature. Id.
31. Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 40-46.
32. Id. at 46-49.
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. Id. at 28.
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international and constitutional law, in the placement of the missiles.3 5 In
this article Ann celebrated their efforts as a "successful story of contem-
porary feminist history-making," which made "cruise missile madness a
matter of public debate.36 She also interrogated the timid, dichotomous
reasoning through which American courts rejected their claims, invoking
the political question doctrine to justify reliance on military expertise and
delegitimate both public questioning and judicial supervision. She con-
cluded by sketching a more responsible judicial stance, which engages
rather than reflexively defers to militarism. "It is my duty to decide this
case," Ann's hypothetical, responsible judge announces:
I can do so with as much confidence in this process as I have in the
many other cases where fact-finding is very difficult. I'm sworn to
uphold my oath of office; I must expect hat the President will uphold
his. If the executive branch is acting illegally, I must order it to de-
sist. Such a confrontation will not be a constitutional crisis; that crisis
results when the [C]onstitution is routinely ignored and when that ac-
tion is ratified by judicial silence. If the executive ignores my deci-
sion, then that will become a real political question. The political
branches and the people will have to decide.
37
While this article is sober and urgent, rather than transgressive and
energetic, it is equally in the outsider mode. It offers a serious, substan-
tive critique that moves Ann's dominance feminist vision into a new
institutional context.38 It challenges courts for their evasions, and endors-
es a group of innovative, radical activists as the models of legal respon-
sibility. It even ends with a song: "I cast my lot with those women, their
methods and their goals, and send them this love song," Ann wrote, quot-
ing a poem from Adrienne Rich.39 I quickly discovered the dissident
character of Ann's position when, in a fit of enthusiasm about this Essay,
35. Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (dismissing constitutional claims
as political questions).
36. Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 27.
37. Id. at 72.
38. The critique of militarism was new for dominance feminism. Catharine MacKinnon has
since taken on the context of armed conflict by looking at rape as an instrument of war or genocide.
See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, in ARE
WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 160, 161-62 (2006); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, in ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 180, 187-88. But to my knowledge Ann's is the first and most system-
atic critique of militarism as a mindset, frame, or practice, to be undertaken from a dominance femi-
nist perspective.
39. The lines quoted are:
Your small hands, precisely equal to my own- / only the thumb is larger, longer-in
these hands / I could trust the world, or in many hands like these, / handling power-tools
or steering-wheel / or touching a human face.... / such hands might carry out an una-
voidable violence / with such restraint, with such a grasp / of the range and limits of vio-
lence / that violence ever after would be obsolete.
Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 73 (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, Twenty-one
Love Poems, No. VI, in THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE: POEMS 1974-77, at 27-28 (1978)).
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I rushed a professional responsibility colleague in the copy room, de-
manding to know his view of lawyers engaging in or endorsing civil dis-
obedience. His chilly perplexity made clear the distance of this potential-
ly transformative piece from the legal mainstream.
There is a lot on display in these articles that demonstrates why Ann
was such an effective instigator of feminist hell-raising. In each of these
pieces, we see a deep critique of our society's subjection of women and
other "outsider" groups, and an equally deep critique of law's complicity,
as reflected in doctrine, objectivist epistemology, dichotomizing, and
deference to existing institutions. There is a vigorous endorsement of
forms of engagement that involve not only thought but also direct action,
not only linearity but also roaming and rambling, not only reasoned ar-
gumentation but also exhortation, poetry, and song.
These articles also demonstrate an emotional range that made Ann
quite unique as a feminist, and even more unique as a dominance femi-
nist. Her work is characterized by joy-in creativity, in solidarity, and in
that moment when we make demands that could make the law and the
world better. It is also characterized by love, a very rare emotion in law
and legal scholarship. She does not simply model it-she specifically
talks about it. "Taking a stand and saying what you really see is a tough
assignment," she said in Surviving Legal De-Education.40 "When anyone
who is committed to liberation does that, love her for it. ' 4' And the
speaker's view of liberation does not have to be the same as Ann's view
for that love to be forthcoming. Ann thought differences of opinion
among allies were the stuff of lively, hard-fought discussions; not the
basis for longstanding divisions. "If we can't agree, or I'm being obsti-
nate, go ahead and call me a bitch," she famously stated, "then give me a
hug and let's make plans to collaborate in the future.' '42 Love for women
whose plight she takes as central, for women and men who try to say
something honest and revealing in face of power, for human possibility
and for what law might be are all present in Ann's work. Ann could also
be fierce, as her work on militarism illustrates best. But her tone in this
work is unusual as well: Ann does not so much seem angry-though
anger would clearly be justified-as she seems serious, aggrieved, and
even disappointed. The law is falling disastrously short, and she knows it
could be doing better. This recognition points to a final affective charac-
teristic which marks Ann's work. There is a kind of courage-a bold
civic commitment-that infuses her scholarship: a quality she sees not as
idiosyncratic but as a stance we should all aspire to. This boldness arises
partly from an understanding that unjust power perpetuates itself when
teachers, students, and citizens fail to confront it. And it arises partly
40. Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 16 1.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162.
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from a belief that each of us has more resources to bring to the confronta-
tion than we may suspect, and we owe it to each other-and to our
shared communities-to use what we have to call institutions to account.
Ann worried about people who let themselves off too easily-be it stu-
dents who sought to avoid the hard work of "legal de-education" or judg-
es who wanted to anesthetize themselves to the forward march of the
military-industrial complex. But Ann worried in a way that was empath-
ic, moral but not moralizing: not "I'm here, what the hell is wrong with
you?" but "you can do this too, let's do it together!" Her sense of em-
powered commitment was solidaristic and, for many of us, contagious.
II. ANN SCALES AS PRAGMATIC INSIDER
I turn now to two works in which Ann functioned more as an insid-
er. The works are linked together in Ann's personal story. In the early
2000s, she was invited to speak about law to a group of Tenth Circuit
judges-the talk became her article Law and Feminism: Together in
Struggle.43 In that talk, she offered an eminently peaceable narrative of
feminist/judicial convergence in a case that recognized that sexual har-
assment could reflect racial as well as gender subordination,44 and she
called for future collaboration between judges and feminist legal schol-
ars. This approach seemed carefully calibrated to win the assent of her
audience, even if it was a little well-behaved by what I tend to think of as
Ann's usual standards. But this was not the way it turned out; she later
noted that with the exception of Judge Henry, who had invited her, her
audience found her talk to be the special pleading of "just another whiny
interest group who wanted its subjective preferences enshrined in law. 45
Instead of being put off by this unexpected chasm, Ann set out to bridge
it. She wanted to help readers understand the legal assumptions that led
judges to classify her as the representative of a whiny, subjectively-
inclined interest group. At the same time, following the suggestion of her
friend Judge Henry, she sought to offer judges "a dejargonized account
of why legal theory, and feminist legal theory in particular, should matter
to them."46
When you venture into Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and
Legal Theory, you know you are in a different kind of Ann Scales work.
There is no talk here about raising hell, or acid dripping on souls-
although there is a lively introduction in which she raises such questions
as "Does she have to use the t-word?" (for theory) and the "f-word?" (for
43. Ann Scales, Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291, 291 n.al
(2003).
44. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1408 (10th Cir. 1987); see id. at 294-96.
45. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (2006)
[hereinafter LEGAL FEMINISM].
46. Id. at 4.
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feminism).47 The book is moderate in tone, non-colloquial in style, and
expansively learned. Ann's broad knowledge of philosophy is on offer
here, as is her intimate knowledge of bodies of law, such as tort. Ann
also builds the case for the relevance of feminist legal theory in a distinc-
tive, non-inflammatory way; she does not cut to the chase of women's
disadvantage. Rather, she begins from a broader, jurisprudential perspec-
tive. She focuses in on some of the ongoing gaps or failings of the legal
system-problems that might be experienced by judges or other main-
stream legal actors, as well as by feminists. For example, judges and
lawyers find it hard to arrive at a shared definition of the rule of law be-
cause law lacks an understanding of its ultimate goals-what Lon Fuller
called the end to which "this activity [is] directed.'48 Law also suffers
from examples of what Ann calls "unexamined certainty"49-it frames
dominant or preferred positions as "objective" and everything else as
"subjective,' '5 ° or it confuses "epistemology" with "ontology" when it
comes to assessing the adequacy of evidence.51 In each of these cases,
law has gravitated, to its detriment, toward an unreflective resolution; her
argument is that legal theory could inform a fuller examination and better
answers.
The second half of the book fleshes out feminist legal theory. Legal
feminism begins, Ann declared, "with the principle that objective reality
is a myth."52 This statement was probably a bit jarring for her judicial
readers, but Ann elaborated it with nuance and moderation. Myths are
not necessarily without value, Ann noted; what this means is that we
need "modesty in matters of knowledge .... 'Knowledge' is always open
to revision."53 Introducing feminism in this way meets judges where they
live; starting not with the situation of women, but with the objectivist
assumptions (instilled in lawyers from the first days of law school) that
make responding to women's inequality difficult. Moreover, Ann frames
the critique of objectivism in terms of doubts about what we can know
that judges have surely experienced (and can therefore relate to). In the
chapters that comprise the rest of the book, she offered an account of
feminist legal theory that is indeed dejargonized, in part by boiling it
down to pithy, accessible principles. These principles are similar in sub-
47. Id. at 4-10. This introduction-I might add-is the first thing I give my undergraduate
students when I teach them Feminist Jurisprudence-so it serves as a path into the field for college
students, as well as for judges.
48. Id. at 30 (quoting Fuller & Perdue, supra note 20, at 52).
49. Id. at 34. Ann describes unexamined certainty, in this case among members of the judici-
ary, as "an invaluable attribute of privilege." Id.
50. Id. at 33 (offering the example of Justice Scalia's critique of the majority's position in
Atkins v. Virginia, in which he objected that "[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obvi-
ously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members," 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
51. Id. at 51-62.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 87.
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stance to (if more calibrated in presentation than) the cheerful impera-
tives that punctuate her more transgressive works: "Challenge false ne-
cessities"'54 (such as long-standing dichotomies that may be blurrier or
more historically contingent than we think); "Deconstruct the status quo
from the level of knowledge";55 or "Find the best answer for now," rec-,, - - •,,56
ognizing that legal approaches are always "provisional.
When I finished this book I was impressed: Ann had done precisely
what she aspired to do. She distilled feminism down to some plausible,
accessible principles, and explained how it applied to certain problems
that must have nagged at most judges at some point in their careers. But
it also struck me that she had gone to a great deal of trouble to begin by
describing shortcomings of law with which judges might more readily
agree; to define feminism in terms of broad goals and methodological
characteristics so that it overlaps more evidently with judges' concerns;
to keep the tone measured and reassuring-quite different from Ann's
more characteristic, searing, cut-to-the-chase critiques. At some level, I
marveled that Ann found it worth the effort to persuade the kind of judg-
es who had been so cool and dismissive toward her earlier, conciliatory
approach. And while I deeply admired the erudition and thoughtful pro-
gression of the argument, I found myself missing her funny, energetic,
sometimes outrageous incitements. But he more I thought about Ann's
pragmatic bridge-building efforts, the more I thought there was some-
thing worth pondering here. We can learn some valuable things about
who Ann was, and what was distinctive about her feminist legal theory,
by trying to understand why it was important to her to write works of this
kind-perhaps I should say, works of both of these kinds.
III. THE OUTSIDER WITHIN: RECONCILING THE STRANDS OF
SCHOLARSHIP
Ann's capacity to write in two divergent styles and tones, highlight-
ing different aspects of the feminist legal project, says something about
the woman herself. Ann was a Whitman-esque character who contained
multitudes57: it is not everyone, after all, who can be a lawyer and a ro-
58deo rider. But she was also a pragmatist who believed in innovation,
experimentation, and having all hands on deck. Ann wanted women,
men, people of color, whites, students, and faculty to join her in making
law accountable to projects of inclusion and justice. As one of the few
law faculty who actually took time away from academia to work as a
54. Id. at 104-05.
55. Id at 107-09.
56. Id. at 111-12.
57. WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself in LEAVES OF GRASS 49, 152 (2013). ("Do I contradict
myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)").
58. Jean Strout, "I'm Only Gonna Tell You This One More Time: " Lessons from Ann Scales,
HARV. J.L. & GENDER (July 28, 2012), http://harvardjlg.com/2012/07/im-only-gonna-tell-you-this-
one-more-time-lessons-from-ann-scales/.
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lawyer, she also knew how much difference it could make to have judges
on board. So it is no surprise, given these pragmatist commitments, that
she would approach multiple groups in different contexts and appeal to
them differently.
But this tension-or, more accurately, this variety-in her work al-
so speaks to the complexity of her view of the law. Law is not some
foundational, univocal edifice. It reflects the way that a hierarchized but
heterogeneous group of actors have spoken to each other and to the pub-
lic over time. It clearly bears the marks of those who have enjoyed the
most power to shape it; but it is not monolithic. There have been mo-
ments of sanity and perspectives of distinctive legal actors to which we
can also appeal. Some of its practices can-even now-have a feminist
valence: think, for example, of Ann's discussion of the analogy between
law and mothering.59 Though, as a legal culture, we may currently be
"stuck," there is nothing necessary about the current state of the law. The
law, like all of us, as Ann was wont to say, is subject to forces of evolu-
tion.60 And this is an interesting choice of term: not revolution or even
transformation, but evolution. The law can change-perhaps will
change-because it bears within itself some of the seeds of that revision
(strands that overlap, in the Wittgensteinian metaphor Ann favored,6'
with the strands of feminism). This potential invites legal actors to think
about how it might be remade differently. It is not-as, for example, in
MacKinnon's work 62-a vision of before and after brought about by the
systematic introduction of a feminist perspective. In Ann's vision, law is
always already amenable to revision, by large steps and small. Given this
amenability, there is no excuse not to jump in immediately and do what
you can.
Finally, Ann's willingness to write in two registers also speaks to
her view of the human subject. Women may be beset, but they always
retain the possibility of agency. In what is probably the most cheerful
sentence that ever employed these words, Ann wrote "The good news
about hegemony is 'counter-hegemony.'63 Women and other outsiders
are, in Ann's view, "guerilla warriors of life in a system of white male
dominance-taking little victories where they can, operating covertly,
59. See supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing Surviving Legal De-Education).
60. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 77.
61. See, e.g., Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 160 (quoting LUDWIG
WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1972))
("And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.").
62. This conception of achieving transformation by using a feminist perspective on the subor-
dinating practice in question to restructure legal doctrine is evident in many facets of MacKinnon's
work, most notably in sexual harassment and pornography. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 217 (1979);
ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY
FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 17 18 (1988).
63. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 135.
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without any apparent organization, on the edges and in a thousand unex-
pected ways. '64 This is a striking, enlivening view of women's agency
and how it can be exercised. Ann was not in the business of lifting the
flag and demanding that people fall in behind it; she was not wary of
women's agency, for fear it might be exercised in ways that did not fit
with her vision. She seemed to be delighted by resistance of all kinds-
who knows, in the end, what strategy might work best? Her role was to
provide a possible endpoint, some markers along the way, and the cheer-
ing, cajoling, inspiring forms of solidarity that made transitions from
stuckness to not-so-stuckness possible.
With the agency of judges, there are some differences in her ap-
proach; they are the beneficiaries and defenders of privilege rather than
those who stand to lose most under current arrangements. But her empa-
thy-and her uncanny ability to see the human at the same time as the
hierarchy-enabled Ann to see that judges may be more similar to out-
siders than we think. They too may feel overwhelmed by the powers
arrayed against them. One of the funniest-and most telling-moments
in Ann's work on militarism was her trip inside the head of a judge de-
ferring to military expertise. When a judge ruling on a challenge to mili-
tarism says, this question "is 'textually committed to another branch" or
"there are no 'judicially . . . manageable standards,"' Ann told us, he
actually meant, "This is freaking me out. There is so much information
flying around and somebody is obviously lying. But World War III can't
really happen, can it? I need to go to chambers and take a Valium. 65
Judges may be defenders of the status quo, but they are prone to elabo-
rate schemes of self-anesthetization, just like the rest of us. However,
relying on judges is not always a "triumph of hope over experience."
66
Judges are also capable, like Ann's judicial hero Harry Blackmun, of
struggling and muddling their way to ethical positions.67 Ann's role in
supporting such agency on the part of judges is subtler and less celebra-
tory than her approach to feminist law students-after all, this is a
somewhat more settled crowd. But she brings to judges who want to do
better the message that they are not alone; they can think about Fuller,
who always wanted to know the end to which the activity was directed,
68
and Holmes, who saw the life of the law in experience. Dipping a toe in
the waters of legal theory-and feminist legal theory in particular-is not
64. Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 147.
65. Ann Scales & Laura Spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial Complex, I
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 541, 552 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
66. Catharine MacKinnon used this phrase to describe her habit of hoping for good decisions
from women judges on cases involving gender inequality. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 215, 220 (1987).
67. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 150.
68. Id. at 192 n.24 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (Little,
Brown, & Co. 1923) (1881)).
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so scary, and it is also important, because maybe legal reasoning is not
working quite as well as we tend to tell ourselves.
I will close by suggesting that Ann was not only capable of sustain-
ing this kind of heterogeneity in her approach; but that she was also ca-
pable of a riveting kind of synthesis, or integration, as in the dazzling
final chapter of Feminist Jurisprudence. In this chapter Ann challenges
readers to consider what she calls a "contemporary solidarity impera-
tive," recognizing that protecting the right to abortion is "the queerist
issue there is"' 69 and that we all need to be at the barricades. Highlighting
this issue is a fascinating choice, not only because of the surprising yet
compelling grounds for collaboration Ann finds here, but also because it
brings together the two strands of her work. In her outsider mode, she is
trying to mediate an ongoing tension between mainstream feminists (who
see "woman" as more fixed in what the term "woman" signifies) and
poststructuralists, recently exemplified by queer theorists (who are criti-
cal both of that fixity and of the increasingly state-identified repertoire of
feminist activists). Refraining and ameliorating disputes among feminists
was one of the things Ann saw as necessary to feminist solidarity.70 In
this chapter, she explains that abortion is both a paradigmatic women's
issue and an issue of bodily discipline, sexual normalization, and imposi-
tion of shame,71 which highlights the convergence of these feminist and
queer theorists and activists, and their respective bodies of work. But at
the same time as she is working on relations between feminist structural-
ists and poststructuralists,72 Ann, in her insider mode, had judges in her
sights. Abortion is an issue on which we cannot afford judicial abdica-
tion. It is also an important example because it permits her to spotlight
the career of Harry Blackmun-the Justice most strongly associated with
69. Id. at 147-49.
70. To take another example, her article, Disappearing Medusa, was a dexterous effort to
bridge a painful rift between Catharine MacKinnon and anti-essentialist feminists of color. Ann
Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 34,
37-41 (1997).
71. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 148-49.
72. Id at 145-47. Here Ann attempts a deliberately brokered entente, suggesting eighteen
"aspects of discussion that we could conditionally agree upon." Id at 145. These include interesting-
ly paired propositions such as:
10. "Gender" is "performative." Gender, in all its manifestations, is also a function of ex-
isting social power. In all the ways that reality bites, but to a degree of gruesomeness that
is impolite to acknowledge, gender hurts. 11. Suffering exists.... 13. It is a legal, politi-
cal, and ethical good thing to do whatever one can to reduce suffering, one's own and that
of all others.
Id. at 146. Or:
14. "Statism" is not the point.... Power exists in many shifting forms. It is not statism to
ask government to intervene on behalf of people who do not possess power on their own
in the world as now constituted.... [A]lthough we should continue debate about the na-
ture and limits of invocations of state power, it is naive to accuse feminists of stat-
ism.... 15. Access to government, however, is not automatically cool. Professor
Ruthann Robson has been right in ... consistently illustrating the "domesticating" effects




women's reproductive rights-who began as a skeptic of feminism and
traveled a bumpy, anguish-ridden path to become an ardent proponent of
women's equality. Blackmun, Ann noted, was
a man who was scared of various things at various times, but who
always eventually rose to the occasion and attempted to do the right
thing.... [H]is papers show a man paying close attention, grappling
with his own biases, and overcoming his own lawyerly reticence and
conservative ideology. By the end, as his opinions show, he under-
stood that abortion was an equality issue, and part of a larger vision
of human dignity.
73
That self-awareness, and refusal to abdicate responsibility for hard
decisions, even when they bring pain or controversy, was the commit-
ment Ann demanded and expected from members of the judiciary. Guid-
ing judges toward responsible decision making, as she subtly negotiated
a collaboration between structuralist and poststructuralist feminists, was
Ann Scales at her best.
IV. CODA: BACK TO THE FUTURE
Ann's insistence on resistant engagement, in a variety of modes and
contexts, and her aspirations to solidarity, whether between feminists and
judges or between women's rights and queer activists, are the hallmarks
of her distinctive, enlivening body of work. They are also reminders to
those of us who aim to continue her efforts, whether through activism or
scholarship. The year since Ann's death has been marked by important
developments in the very fields that elicited her passion, fields that de-
mand challenging, solidaristic response.
Some of these developments concern the military, and as Ann might
have added, the persistence of militarism. The repeal of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" in 2011 was followed by a recommendation by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to re-evaluate the restrictions on women's service in
combat.74 Yet if these changes mean unprecedented access for two
groups of "outsiders" to the military, they have left intact many of the
norms of the institution. Female service members must negotiate a world
where they may enter into combat, but are still subject to massive pres-
sures of sexualization and devaluation. An epidemic of sexual assaults in
the military has rendered women service members twice as likely as ci-
vilians to be sexually victimized, and the system of internal review and
courts martial has utterly failed to respond.75 Military authorities estimate
73. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 150.
74. Julian E. Barnes & Dion Nissenbaum, Combat Ban for Women to End, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
24, 2013, 10:49 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578260123802564276.html.
75. Molly O'Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim Victims as Defense
Department Fails Females, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2012, 9:36 AM EDT),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/06/military-sexual-assault-defense-
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that only fourteen percent of assaults are reported, and only six percent
76
of those reports yield convictions by courts-martial. Moreover, changes
in the modes and settings of armed conflict that may have made the inte-
gration of outsiders more acceptable to the military mainstream are pos-
ing their own risks. Serving with women or gay men may seem less of a
daunting prospect when war is waged not in a foxhole or even a Humvee,
but by remote-controlled drones, which now threaten to infiltrate civilian
life, and enable soldiers, commanders, and citizens to distance them-
selves from the costs of warfare.77 Both these newer service members
and their heterosexual, male counterparts may also be supplemented, or
even replaced, by private contractors whose omnipresence underscores
the entrenchment of the military-industrial complex.7 8 Though access
may be broader-a serious step forward for those who aim to vindicate
their civic commitments or experience equal citizenship through military
service-the "megamachine," Ann might say, "rolls on."79 The damage
perpetrated by objectifying norms, and the continuing distance between
military decision making and public scrutiny, invites a collaborative ef-
fort by feminist and LGBT activists to interrogate the structure and direc-
tion of the institution into which we are now being accepted.
Other developments concern the domain of reproductive and inti-
mate choice. On the one hand, the parties to Ann's proposed "solidarity
initiative" might seem to be divided by recent developments. Access to
abortion and even birth control have become ever more contentious, as
the 2012 election gave rise to a "Republican war on women."80 At the
same time, gay marriage is approaching a high-water mark of ac-
ceptance,81 with leaders from President Obama to Republican Senator
department n_1834196.html. As a woman service member who suffered multiple sexual assaults in
Afghanistan explained: "Suicide bombers in pieces, [people] pulling dead American soldiers out of
Humvees.... [D]eath was something I had to deal with. I never, ever thought I was gonna have to
deal with my supporters being the ones that did the most damage." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Addressing the Epidemic of Military Sexual
Assault, DEMOCRACY Now (May 9, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2013/5/9/addressingthe-epidemic of militarysexualassault.
76. O'Toole, supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., David Sirota, How Drones Deceive Us: The Advantage of Technologized War-
fare Is Also Its Most Worrying: The Perception of Decreased Risk to the Aggressor, SALON (May 9,
2013, 12:00 PM MST), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/09/how drones deceive us/ (describing how
drones provide distance from conflict, perceived risk reduction, and how the simplicity of drone
strikes remove critical deterrents to violence).
78. See Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for Reconsidering How
Human Rights Obligations Are Applied to Private Military Security Firms, 35 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 29, 38-42 (2012) (discussing the rise of private military contractors and the challenge
of imposing legal accountability).
79. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 97.
80. Frank Rich, Stag Party: The GOP 's Woman Problem Is that It Has a Serious Problem
with Women, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 25, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/gop-women-problem-
2012-4/.
81. See, e.g., Daniel Politi, New Poll Shows Huge Surge in Support for Marriage Equality,
SLATE (Mar. 18, 2013, 3:54 PM),




Robert Portman celebrating the formation of same-sex-led families.82 It
is a period during which, as Kenji Yoshino noted, students are more
comfortable coming out as gay or lesbian than admitting that they once
got an abortion.83 But if we recall that the bridge Ann sought to build in
the final chapter of Legal Feminism was between feminists and queer
activists,84 we may see the ground for more productive collaboration.
The forms of gay and lesbian identity that are most readily accepted, as
queer scholars and activists have observed, are those which most closely
approach the norm of the heterosexual nuclear family: sexuality is do-
mesticated within the confines of quasi-marital relationship and chil-
drearing.8 5 The advent of same-sex marriage may render those who prac-
tice serial monogamy, or live out their sexuality in sex clubs or public
spaces rather than in the confines of the marital bedroom, as vulnerable
as a woman who seeks an abortion or a sexually active college student
who objects to her Jesuit university's failure to subsidize birth control.86
All these expressions of sexual agency stand at great distance from the
norm of the "natural family" a regulative fiction which is making a
surprising comeback in some quarters87 -or its emerging homonormative
counterpart. This resurgent, normalizing sexual politics demands a spirit-
ed coalitional response, which can take Ann's "solidarity initiative" into
new territory.
And so the work continues. Formal equal opportunity-crucial
though it may be-will always come more easily than the more search-
82. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand on
Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A]; Michael Falcone & Z. Byron Wolf, Repub-
lican Rob Portman Supports Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/republican-rob-portman-supports-gay-
marriage/story?id= 18736731.
83. Kenji Yoshino, "Lawrence as Ur-Text," Conference on Gender, Sexuality and Democratic
Citizenship, Cardozo Law School, Nov. 14, 2010.
84. For an illuminating discussion of the differences between gay/lesbian politics and queer
politics, see Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 89, 100 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
85. This pattern has led Lisa Duggan and others to coin the term "homonormativity" to de-
scribe the pressure to conform to this newly acceptable version of a homosexual self-presentation.
Duggan notes, "[Homonormativity] is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative
assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a
demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity
and consumption." Lisa Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism,
in MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175, 179 (Russ
Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002); see also Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) ("Resisting the normative and epistemic frame that values
nonmarital forms of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage," and embracing the goal
of"unseat[ing] marriage as the measure of all things").
86. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh vs. Sandra Fluke: A Timeline, THE WEEK (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article.php?id=225214 (detailing sequence of events through which conservative
talk-show host Rush Limbaugh called Sandra Fluke, the Georgetown Law student who testified
before Congress about the need for subsidized birth control, a "slut").
87. For a discussion of the resurgence of the "natural family" in the discourse of the contem-
porary Right, see Kathryn Abrams, Disenchanting the Public/Private Distinction, in IMAGINING
NEW LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25, 25-26 (Austin Sarat,
Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds. 2012).
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ing normative and institutional reassessments that would give such op-
portunities more lasting impact. This is why Ann so often focused on
these latter challenges. They are challenges to be undertaken by the out-
siders now within: those who cannot only speak truth to power, but can
communicate it in registers that those in power can at least sometimes
apprehend. The often glacial character of the progress, the sense of tak-
ing two steps forward and one step back, should motivate rather than
disturb us-as they did Ann. "Doing this is a lifetime's work," she mem-
orably reminded us, "not doing it is moral idiocy."
88
88. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 32 (1992).
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